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Is Abandoning State Action Asking Too
Much of the Constitution?
By ScoTr E. SUNDBY*
Professor Friesen has made a convincing case that either as a ques-
tion of original intent or of textual interpretation the requirement of state
action under the California Constitution is an open one.1 She has
presented the issue primarily as a policy choice and it is in that vein that
I will pursue the discussion of whether state action should be required
under the constitution. Specifically, I want to raise the question whether
extending the California Constitution to include protection against pri-
vate actors asks too much of the constitution.
I come to this question as one who wants to be convinced that state
action should not be required, but has three general concerns or, in the
great California tradition, propositions, that I believe need to be
addressed:
First, the state action doctrine reflects a legitimate distinction
between government and private conduct and the dangers each
poses to constitutional rights.
Second, extending constitutional protections to private actions
not only expands the judiciary's power to find constitutional viola-
tions, it also changes the judiciary's role within the framework of
constitutional decisionmaking.
Third, applying the constitution to private actions changes the
constitution's role from regulator of governmental behavior to
moral arbitrator of private disputes.
I should note at the outset that one could agree with each of these pro-
positions and still conclude that the balance of advantages and disadvan-
tages favors extending the constitution's protections to private actions.
* Associate Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I would
like to thank Professors Mary Kay Kane and David Faigman for providing helpful comments
and suggestions on an earlier draft.
1. See Friesen, Should California's Constitutional Guarantees of Individual Rights Apply
Against Private Actions?, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 111 (1989). The strongest argument
against a state action requirement applies to the right of privacy in article 1, section 1. The
justifications for passage of the right included concerns over both government and private
intrusions. See White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 222, 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 106
(1975) (noting arguments in voter pamphlet included business use of personal information).
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These are the issues and consequences of abandoning state action, how-
ever, that must be addressed before such a step is taken.
Proposition One: The state action doctrine reflects a legitimate
distinction between government and private conduct
and the dangers each poses to constitutional
rights.
The state action doctrine has been attacked on a number of fronts as
a basis for distinguishing whose conduct is subject to constitutional re-
straints. My first proposition is simply that, despite its shortcomings,2
the state action doctrine makes a legitimate distinction between govern-
ment and private action. One can argue over whether a line should be
drawn at all or whether state action is the best line, but the doctrine's
critics overstate their case to the extent that they characterize the doc-
trine as irrational and arbitrary.
The argument against state action takes several different forms.
First, some have contended that state action is an illusory distinction
because all violations of constitutional rights implicate the government.
This argument contends that state action exists even when a private actor
violates a constitutional right because the state becomes a party to the
deprivation itself-an accessory after the fact-by allowing the private
action to go unsanctioned.3 Consequently, because state action is every-
where, the state action doctrine's flaw is that it really represents no line
at all.
The difficulty with this first attack on state action is that it assumes
the government's failure to supply a remedy for a grievance is tanta-
mount to approval of the grievous act. The failure to intervene essen-
tially becomes the equivalent of the government doing the act itself or
being actively involved in its commission. Yet, the situation in which the
state itself brings about the violation is not necessarily the same as when
the state's "culpability" rests on its failure to provide a remedy after the
fact.
2. The United States Supreme Court's development of the state action doctrine, for ex-
ample, has been less than a model of consistency. See Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) (describing state
action doctrine as a "conceptual disaster area").
3. See Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 503, 514-16, 521-25
(1985) (providing historical and positivist support for view that state's failure to provide a
remedy constitutes state action); Note, State Action: A Pathology and a Proposed Cure, 64
CALIF. L. REV. 146, 155-59 (1976) (issue should be state "deprivation" not state "action"); cf
Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of private racially restrictive cove-
nants constitutes state action).
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When the government acts or is significantly involved in another's
actions, it sends a message of active approval and choice. Whatever the
government's rationale in undertaking the act that results in the alleged
violation, the state's responsibility for the decision to actively proceed is
clear. When the government's role is one of refraining from entering a
private dispute, on the other hand, the choice of nonintervention does
not necessarily translate into condonation of the private act. At least
where sound reasons exist for not recognizing a claim as a legal cause of
action,4 the government's refusal to recognize the claim as actionable is
not a statement that either party is right or wrong, but a decision that
such disputes are best resolved outside the legal system. Thus, it over-
states the case to argue that the failure to provide a governmental remedy
automatically makes the state a party to the private action. As one com-
mentator has observed:
[T]he... sweeping assertion that individuals engaged in ordinary
activities on their own behalf, far removed from the business of
government, are wielding the power of the state-as though those
individuals wore uniforms and badges-merely because their con-
duct is not prohibited by state law or protected by the Constitu-
tion, is a notion disquietingly totalitarian, conspicuously artificial,
and in no way deducible from positivism or any other legal or
political doctrine.5
A second way of arguing that state action is an arbitrary line is to
adopt the perspective of the individual whose rights are being violated.
To the employee who is fired for expressing political beliefs contrary to
4. For a discussion of policy reasons for not recognizing constitutional claims against
private actors, see infra notes 21-36 and accompanying text. General reasons for not recog-
nizing a non-constitutional cause of action may include practical concerns such as the in-
creased burden on the legal system as well as more theoretical beliefs that certain disputes are
inappropriate for governmental resolution. The distinction between state intervention and
nonintervention may prove unsatisfactory, however, if no legitimate reason for noninterven-
tion exists; the refusal to provide a remedy now can be seen as an indirect decision on the
merits of the private dispute.
The proposed distinction between intervention and nonintervention is meant only as a
general proposition. Situations may exist in which the failure to act is equally culpable to
actually carrying out the act. In the criminal law area, for example, an omission to act may be
criminal if a special duty of care was owed to the victim. W. LA FAVE & A. ScOrr, CRIMI-
NAL LAW 202-07 (2d ed. 1986). One might argue that the state always owes such a special
duty to its citizens when constitutional values are involved. Such a view, though, requires a
very broad perception of the government's reach into everyday affairs. Still, the possibility
remains of finding certain specific settings in which state nonintervention will amount to state
action because of a special duty or because the justifications for nonintervention are out-
weighed by the need to provide a remedy. Cf. Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial
enforcement of private racially restrictive covenants constitutes state action).
5. Goodman, Professor Brest on State Action and Liberal Theory, and a Postscript to
Professor Stone, 130 U. PA. L. Rv. 1331, 1338-39 (1982).
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those of her employer, her freedom of speech has been infringed whether
the employer is the government or a private entity. Yet, under the state
action doctrine, who can claim constitutional protection is based on the
transgressor's identity rather than the nature of the acts. Thus, the em-
ployee's ability to assert a claim based on a constitutional violation will
depend on the apparently fortuitous fact of whether her employer is the
government.
This disparate treatment becomes less objectionable, however, if the
identity of the transgressor affects the nature of the transgression itself.
In other words, if the same action has different consequences if done by
the government rather than by a private entity, and the difference argues
more strongly for extending constitutional protections against govern-
mental actions, then the concept of state action does represent a rational
line. I believe that such a distinction between private and government
conduct can be found if the question is asked from a societal rather than
an individual perspective.6 The distinction stems from two basic differ-
ences between the consequences of governmental and private actions.
First, the government poses a greater danger to the citizenry's con-
stitutional rights because of the government's pervasiveness and re-
sources. General Motors may be powerful, but it simply does not have
the same potential as the government to stifle the exercise of constitu-
tional rights. Again, it is important to distinguish the danger from indi-
vidual and societal perspectives. Certainly, General Motors might
suppress a particular employee's free speech right as effectively as the
government, but the government poses the greater danger to society as a
whole. This argument is not meant to ignore or downplay the political
and economic power that corporations possess;7 yet, absent some con-
spiratorial cooperation, the breadth of power wielded by corporations
simply does not compare to that available to the state.' The government
6. One might argue that the perspective should be that of the aggrieved party and not a
broader societal view. That issue, however, is a policy choice over what the constitution repre-
sents, an issue addressed later. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. My only pur-
pose at this juncture is to establish that state action does provide a rational distinction if one
looks at the differences between private and governmental action from a societal perspective.
7. Cf Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1131-33, 1134-35,
1138-39 (1980) (describing the economic power of modern corporations and consequences for
state action); Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and Enrichment of Democracy:
Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. RaV. 689, 694 ("[t]he sovereign use of prop-
erty rights by private collectives are [sic] a major threat to our constitutional values of personal
freedoms.").
8. If corporate power should expand to such an extent that corporations and businesses
exercise control over the populace comparable to that of the state, state action can be broadly
defined to include acts of corporations licensed by the state. See Berle, Constitutional Limita-
tions on Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic
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not only has the ability to affect more than a limited sector of the popu-
lace through its actions, it has both economic power, in the form of taxes,
grants, and control over social welfare programs, and physical power,
through law enforcement agencies, which are capable of coercion far be-
yond that of the most powerful private actors. Consequently, if one
views state action as an attempt to draw a line based on the greatest
power to affect citizens' lives, state action is not an irrational line.9
Second, an individual generally has greater choice and alternatives
in dealing with private actors than when dealing with the government.
When the government acts, often few alternatives are available for re-
course. Individuals denied welfare benefits, business licenses, or the op-
portunity to participate in the electoral process have no realistic
alternatives. If a private actor denies a person his or her constitutional
rights, however, other options are usually available. One can work for a
different employer, lease from a different landlord, or find a different fo-
rum in which to express one's views. The alternatives often may be oner-
ous in the private arena, but they are not foreclosed. Moreover, if
alternatives do not materialize and private actors are placing unaccept-
able restrictions on others' liberties, the government can provide a legis-
lative remedy; for example, laws can be passed prohibiting discrimination
in the workplace or controlling the use of invasive techniques such as
polygraphy testing."0 In contrast, when the state itself acts to violate
Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 942-46 (1952). Such an approach would require a radical
change in current state action doctrine, but would allow constitutional protections to be ex-
tended consistent with a concern over collective tyranny rather than simply as a means to fill
in holes in the law of torts.
9. The emphasis on the government's power is not meant to suggest that state action
should be limited only to direct governmental acts. In fact, recognizing the pervasiveness of
the government's reach perhaps argues most strongly for a broad definition of state action,
sensitive to the many ways the state can influence, directly or indirectly, private behavior.
10. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000; Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42
U.S.C. § 3601 (prohibiting discrimination in contexts such as housing and employment); Em-
ployee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 2001 (strictly regulating when private
employers can utilize polygraph tests); Ordinance section 3300 A.5, San Francisco Police Code
(prohibiting drug testing of employees except in narrowly defined circumstances); cf New
York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988) (upholding ordinance
banning discrimination in clubs meeting certain criteria); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v.
Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (upholding state law barring discrimination by business
establishments).
When the legislature does pass legislation governing private acts that parallels constitu-
tional values, a strong argument can be made that interpretations of the statute should reflect
the constitutional values at stake. See Summers, supra note 7, at 722-23. Using constitutional
values to interpret statutory rights broadly is an issue distinct from whether the constitutional
rights themselves should govern private acts. Id. at 694-96 (proper response to private threats
to freedoms is legislation, not abandoning state action).
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civil liberties, often the only recourse may lie with the judiciary enforcing
the constitution.
The foregoing distinctions offer broad rationale for differentiating
private and state conduct. Admittedly, the rationale are not perfect and
do not work as well once the focus is narrowed to individual settings in
which the state and private actors are bureaucrats who appear indistin-
guishable except that one enterprise is funded by the state and the other
is not.1" My point simply is that despite the anomalies, legitimate dis-
tinctions do exist between government and private actors when viewed
from a broader perspective.12 The remaining propositions address the
question whether the state-private distinction in fact should be made.
Proposition Two: Extending constitutional protections to private
actions not only expands the judiciary's power to find
constitutional violations, it also changes the
judiciary's role within the framework
of constitutional decisionmaking.
Both opponents and supporters of the state action doctrine agree
that if constitutional claims are allowed against private actors, the judici-
ary's power will be increased.1 3 The courts would be obligated to balance
11. It is particularly in the employment context, however, that the state-private distinc-
tion appears most happenstance. Many jobs with similar or identical tasks are performed both
in the public and private sectors. Given the similarities in everyday duties and the generic
quality of office politics, it may appear arbitrary that one supervisor becomes a state actor
because she works for a state agency while another bureaucrat remains free from constitutional
restraints because she works for a private employer.
Even in this context, an argument can be made that to the extent a state enterprise is
involved and, consequently, public monies are being spent, the state bureaucrat's actions do
raise different societal concerns. As an individual I may disapprove of certain private employ-
ers' practices, but as a citizen-taxpayer I have a heightened concern where a government em-
ployer is involved, because my tax money is being used to support such a practice. Cf. Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968) (taxpayer has standing to challenge expenditure of federal
funds to aid religious schools as violating Establishment Clause of First Amendment). More-
over, when the government actively supports or engages in the conduct, the message is one of
express approval rather than simply a decision to refrain from entering the dispute. See supra
notes 4, 5 and accompanying text.
12. I must acknowledge that my view may be deviant given that, unlike Professor
Chemerinsky's and Friesen's students, I was not surprised as a student to learn of the state
action doctrine. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 519 n.79; Friesen, supra note 1, at 128 &
n.58. The source of this deviancy is beyond the scope of this Commentary. See generally S.
FREUD, GENERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY (1963).
13. See generally Friesen, supra note 1, at 116-17; Choper, Thoughts on State Action: The
"Government Function" and "Power Theory" Approaches, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 757, 763 (cau-
tioning against expanding judiciary's power to include constitutional claims against private
actors); Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights: Rethinking "'Rethinking State Action," 80
Nw. U.L. REv. 558 (1985) (abandonment of state action would expand judiciary's power).
rVol. 17:139
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the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and the defendant and decide
which right prevails under the constitution. At first blush this is not a
particularly novel role for the courts because it involves two traditional
judicial functions: the common-law power to define torts and the power
to interpret the constitution's meaning, which often involves balancing
different constitutional values. I would suggest, however, that the com-
ing together of these two powers-allowing the courts to create constitu-
tional torts between private actors-raises the stakes by removing the
judiciary from the check and balance framework that presently exists.
The problem is best understood by first noting how, standing alone,
the judiciary's common-law and constitutional interpretation powers
each are limited in their scope. A court's common-law power to define a
new tort or expand an existing one is checked by the legislature, which
can overrule or modify the common-law tort. Likewise, the judiciary's
power of constitutional interpretation is a limited one, because under the
state action doctrine the courts can act as a constitutional interpreter
only when state conduct is involved. Thus, the California Supreme
Court's power to engage in constitutional interpretation is derived from
its role as a check on other state actors.
14
If the state action requirement is removed, both limitations are lost.
Unlike common-law torts which the legislature can overrule, the legisla-
ture cannot overrule or modify a constitutional right found by a court,
,which is why Professor Friesen appropriately calls these rights "super
torts."15 Consequently, no check by another branch of government ex-
ists over the judiciary's creation of new constitutional torts. Moreover,
because the courts can now engage in constitutional interpretation even
when a governmental entity has not acted or become involved, the
court's role as constitutional interpreter no longer is limited by its func-
tion as a check on other state actors. The net effect of removing the state
action requirement would be to extend the judiciary's traditional com-
mon-law powers into the arena of constitutional interpretation, cloaked
with the power of Marbury v. Madison,"6 and limited only by the ability
14. The state actor in question may be another member of the judiciary.
15. Friesen, supra note 1, at 130. This power to create "super torts" is different from the
power the United States Supreme Court has exercised to find a nonstatutory remedy for consti-
tutional violations. See, ag., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979); Carlson v. Green,
446 U.S. 14 (1980). In these cases, the Court did not impose new constitutional duties on
private actors, but merely provided a remedy for already recognized constitutional rights.
16. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."). See also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958)
("[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition
of the law of the Constitution.").
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of the parties to frame their issues under such broad values as freedom of
speech, equal protection, or privacy.
Nor do I find the alternative limits on the courts' powers particu-
larly persuasive. For example, the suggestion that the constitution can
be amended to overrule undesirable holdings poses twin dangers. First,
the danger arises of turning the constitution into a document resembling
a legislative code if the idea is that amendments are to be proposed and
passed to overrule specific rulings for specific settings. Additionally, the
danger looms that those seeking an amendment to overturn an unfavora-
ble ruling would seek an amendment with a broader scope to preclude
future unfavorable rulings in the area. Consequently, an objection to a
particular ruling might spawn an amendment leading to an even broader
repeal of constitutional rights.
Nor do judicial elections and recalls cure the problem. First, remov-
ing a judge does not by itself overturn his or her rulings. The overturn-
ing of existing rulings falls to the new appointees, who must contend with
the issue of stare decisis. Such a roundabout approach to constructing
constitutional doctrine would be extremely cumbersome and would
threaten the stability that is one of the hallmarks of our legal system.
More fundamentally, I would hesitate to advocate using judicial recall
and elections as methods of interpreting the constitution because they
create the distinct danger of turning the judiciary into a political body
more concerned with opinion polls than justice. Such a situation eventu-
ally would erode the public's confidence in the judiciary as an independ-
ent and neutral decisionmaker.
As with the other propositions, the problems that would be associ-
ated with expansion of the judiciary's role do not necessarily mean that
retaining the state action doctrine is the best choice. If the alternative is
to let constitutional values go unvindicated, the proper decision may be
to allow the judicial power to expand beyond its traditional contexts.
Such an expansion, however, should be undertaken with a clear notion of
how the balance between the different branches of government is being
changed.
Proposition Three: Applying the constitution to private actions
changes the constitution's role from regulator of
governmental behavior to moral arbitrator of
private disputes.
This characterization is derived directly from one of the major advo-
cates of abandoning state action, Professor Chemerinsky, who states,
"The effect of discarding the concept of state action is that the Constitu-
[Vol. 17:139
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tion would be viewed as a code of social morals, not just of governmental
conduct, bestowing individual rights that no entity, public or private,
could infringe without a compelling justification." 7 If one agrees with
Professor Chemerinsky's prediction of the effect of abandoning state ac-
tion, as I do, the question then becomes the one with which we started:
Is this asking too much of the constitution? As Professor Friesen recog-
nizes, extending constitutional protection to private acts opens up a new
panorama of constitutional challenges. "8 Taken to its logical extreme, an
individual could sue her neighbor for not inviting her to a dinner party,
alleging a violation of her first amendment or equal protection rights.19
Professor Friesen argues, and undoubtedly is correct, that a court would
disallow such a claim once it weighed the plaintiff's constitutional rights
against the defendant's freedom of association rights.20
I Even if we can be confident of that outcome, however, several
problems remain. First, similar frivolous claims will arise where the de-
fendant has no countervailing constitutional right; the plaintiff may es-
tablish a constitutional violation when the problem is a nosy neighbor
snooping inside her garage. Calling such an act a constitutional violation
trivializes the constitution, transforming it from a blueprint of funda-
mental freedoms into a document for litigating everyday disputes.2"
Fairness requires acknowledgment that the problem of frivolous
constitutional claims is not confined to private actions. State infringe-
ments, such as the plaintiff's claim in Parratt v. Taylor22 that his due
process rights were violated because the mail clerk in the prison in which
he was incarcerated lost a $23.50 mail order package, can also be frivo-
lous. With private actors, however, the problem is exacerbated by the
17. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 550.
18. See Friesen, supra note 1, at 115.
19. The dinner party hypothetical is a popular example, along with the suggestion that
without state action demonstrators could not be excluded from people's living rooms. See
generally Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 538 (raising the examples and demonstrating how
such claims would not succeed).
20. See Friesen, supra note 1, at 115-16.
21. Although the likelihood of some of these claims being filed may be marginal given
litigation costs, the increase in the courts' caseload over the last decade does not leave one
sanguine. See generally Marvell, Caseload Growth-Past and Future Trends, 71 JUDICATURE
151 (1987); R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985). But see infra
note 35 (citing authorities who argue that abandoning state action will not greatly increase
caseload).
22. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). The Court did not unanimously agree that such a claim should
be cognizable under the Constitution. Justices Stewart and Powell both expressed concern
that recognizing such a claim trivialized the Constitution and suggested that a due process
"deprivation" should be limited to intentional state actions. Id. at 544-45 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring); see id. at 548-49 (Powell, J., concurring) (claims based on unintentional conduct should
not be viewed as due process "deprivation").
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increase in the number and the variety of settings in which private actors
operate. With a state action requirement, a constitutional claim always
will have at least the significance of involving government action and its
implications for how our system of government should work.
At the risk of overromanticizing the citizenry's perception of the
constitution, the constitution's current moral force would be diminished
if day-to-day affronteries raised potential constitutional claims. This loss
of respect also might extend to the judiciary if the courts become per-
ceived as having assumed the role of regulating the conduct of everyday
affairs. As Judge Learned Hand once wrote, "For myself it would be
most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew
how to choose them, which I assuredly do not."23
Additionally, even if many frivolous questions are handled through
judicial balancing, resulting in broad and clear rules such as The Dinner
Party Rule (no constitutional right exists to attend a neighbor's dinner
party), the overall effect may be to dilute protections. I make this argu-
ment with some trepidation, because a certain wariness is always justified
when the argument is that fewer constitutional rights will result if one
extends the constitution's scope of protections.24 The United States
Supreme Court has forwarded this apparently liberal rationale of protect-
ing constitutional rights by restricting their application to justify not ex-
tending the exclusionary rule to the states,25 to deny an automatic right
to counsel in felony cases,26 and to find that "separate but equal ac-
23. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTs 73 (1958). Justice Frankfurter urged similar caution
against the judiciary risking its independence:
Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a
democratic society. Their judgment is best informed, and therefore most dependable,
within narrow limits. Their essential quality is detachment, founded on indepen-
dence. History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when
courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibil-
ity in choosing between competing political, economic and social pressures.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Professor Robert Nagel has argued that "an unchecked urge to enforce [constitutional]
norms through adjudication may in fact undermine the capacity for durable constitutional
government." NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES 25 (1989). He warns against overre-
liance on judicial interpretation for establishment of constitutional norms in part because the
Constitution "does not apply to many public issues or, at least .... in any determinative way."
Id. at 25. The problems and dangers of trying to resolve all difficult policy questions through
constitutional adjudication would be multiplied if the Constitution were extended to cover
private conflicts as well.
24. This wariness is wittily reflected in the title of Professor Chemerinsky's reply defend-
ing his call for the abandonment of the state action doctrine. Chemerinsky, More is Not Less
A Rejoinder to Professor Marshall, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 571 (1986).
25. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
26. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942) (right to counsel applies only when special
circumstances exist).
comodations" do not violate the Constitution.27 Yet, the cases that even-
tually reversed those holdings, Mapp v. Ohio,28 Gideon v. Wainwright,29
and Brown v. Board of Education,", stand as some of the Court's
proudest moments in constitutional history. And, obviously, the legal
sky did not fall upon the extension of such rights.
Despite these examples in which expanding a constitutional right
did not result in fewer protections, instances also exist in which the
Court has extended constitutional coverage that ultimately did result in
the dilution of rights."1 The specific cases that illustrate my concern are
Camara v. Municipal Court32 and Terry v. Ohio,33 in which the Court
extended fourth amendment coverage to include housing inspections and
police stops and frisks. In one sense, the cases are expansive holdings
because they extended the Fourth Amendment to areas not traditionally
covered. In the long run, however, they have lowered protections, be-
cause to extend the Fourth Amendment to these areas, the Court has had
to move from the strict requirement of a warrant based on probable
cause to a broader reasonableness test. In the process, the Court has lost
its focus on individualized suspicion and opened the door to a wide-range
of governmental intrusions.34
I do not want to play the role of a. constitutional Cassandra and
suggest that such dilution is always inevitable. On the other hand, it
does not seem far-fetched to suggest that if constitutional protections are
extended to private actions as well as government-citizen matters, a court
will tend to err on the side of restricting the scope of the right rather than
give an expansive reading. This tendency would seem particularly likely
given the existing perception that the courts are already overburdened by
a litigation explosion.35 Consequently, although abandoning state action
27. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) ("If one race be inferior to the other
socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.").
28. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule applies to the states).
29. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel requires appointment of an attorney in felony
cases).
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (segregated school system violates Equal Protection Clause).
31. Cf Crosby, New Frontiers: Individual Rights Under the California Constitution, 17
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81 (1989) (large number of claims of right to privacy under California
Constitution has led some judges to call for lowering of "compelling interest" standard); see
also Marshall, supra note 13, at 567-68 (noting danger of dilution of rights if extended to
private actors).
32. 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies to housing inspections).
33. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (police stop and frisks subject to fourth amendment protections).
34. See generally Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief
of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. Rnv. 383 (1988).
35. One of the major ideas behind abandoning the state action requirement is, of course,
that claims currently without remedy would be redressable through the courts. Yet, many
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might expand the. range of remedies against private actors, ultimately
such a move might lead to a watered down version of constitutional
rights. 36
Conclusion
The state action doctrine can be cast rather easily in an unfavorable
light. In its least attractive form, the doctrine can be seen as saying that
a private citizen should have the right to act like a bigot or silence others
unreasonably without constitutional restraints. What I have attempted
to do is provide a more rational and attractive explanation for why state
action may exist as a doctrine in constitutional law. I would prefer to
look at the desirability of state action in the more traditional way that
constitutional questions are framed when the issue is one of a private
liberty interest conflicting with a broader societal interest: Does a suffi-
cient societal interest exist to justify extending constitutional restraints to
private activity?37 I believe that one's reaction to the three propositions
that I have identified will help answer that question. Society may be at a
point at which it wants to extend the constitution to all actions that im-
pinge on constitutional values, but such a decision should not be made
under the illusion that all that is involved is a slight change in course.
have suggested that the tort system is already overburdened with a litigation explosion. See
generally Marvell, supra note 21; R. POSNER, supra note 21. Some commentators have pre-
dicted, however, that abandoning state action "'need not occasion any long run surfeit of
cases.'" Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 549 (quoting Professor Van Alstyne); see also id.
("[T]he overall increase in suits might be more of a drizzle than the expected flood.").
36. Professor Marshall concludes that the question is really one of a trade-off, asking
"whether the cure offered for private infringements of constitutional rights is worth a remedy
that undercuts existing constitutional protections against state officials"? Marshall, supra note
13, at 569.
37. See Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private
Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 656, 698 (1974).
